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Abstract
Permitted trading has become one of the leading approaches to manage groundwater supplies 
and mitigate issues such as scarcity, contamination, and aquatic biodiversity loss. Water markets 
have developed all over the world, reflecting varied priorities and accommodating regional 
economic, geographical, and political realities. Proponents of these markets extol their efficiency 
and flexibility, arguing that negotiated transactions provide a transparent process to determine 
the price of water, and that the voluntary exchange of permits leads to an optimal reallocation of 
property rights. Further, they allow regulators to place a limit on the amount of total water that 
can be withdrawn.
However, groundwater remains a critically scarce resource in the case of numerous aquifers 
regulated with market mechanisms around the world. Indeed, continued overexploitation and 
multifarious concomitant issues such as sinking water tables, pollution, and land subsidence 
suggest deficiencies in this approach. While a well-designed market may ostensibly ensure that 
property rights are explicitly defined and that there are no transaction costs, I argue that as 
aquifers are complexes of dynamic, interrelated systems, such broad policy instruments miss 
critical confounding variables; where water trading has failed, hydrogeological particularities 
and the heterogeneous effects of trading over space generate information asymmetries, challenge 
pricing accuracy, and preclude efficiency.
Following a brief explanation of some key terminology, I survey the history of water 
management in the U.S and discuss the economic justifications of market-based water 
management efforts. I then conduct a coupled human and natural systems based investigation 
into why Coasian bargaining may not lead to a Pareto efficient outcome for groundwater permit 
trading schemes, and the computational, economic, and political sources of market inefficiencies. 
I find that resource permitting and trading in a free market is not an adequately dynamic 
groundwater management solution, and leads to a set of unanticipated consequences I refer to as 
confounding externalities. I perform a case analysis of the Edwards Aquifer in San Antonio, 
Texas through this framework before suggesting ancillary instruments that may enhance the 
performance of cap-and-trade schemes.
In the West, it is said, water flows uphill toward money. And it literally 
does, as it leaps three thousandfeet across the Tehachapi Mountains in 
gigantic siphons to slake the thirst of Los Angeles, as it is shoved a 
thousandfeet out o f Colorado River canyons to water Phoenix and Palm 
Springs and the irrigates lands around them. It goes 444 miles (the 
distance from Boston to Washington) by aqueduct from the Feather 
River to south of L.A. It goes in man-made rivers, in siphons, in tunnels. 
In a hundred years, actually less, God’s riverine handiwork in the West 
has been stood on its head. A number of rivers have been nearly dried 
up. One now flows backward. Some flow through mountains into other 
rivers ’ beds. There are huge reservoirs where there was once desert; 
there is desert, or cropland, where there were once huge shallow
swamps and lakes.
It still isn’t enough. ”
- Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing
Water, 1986
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The definition of groundwater, and some other key terms
As one of the principal elements of this paper is an analysis of the political, economic, and legal 
context in which groundwater is exploited or conserved, and as the jurisdiction and mandate of 
any institution licensed to manage a resource are determined by the definition of that resource, it 
is necessary, at the outset, to define some key terms. Broadly, groundwater is any water that 
saturates soil or rock, is naturally banked within the crevices or pores of earth’s geologic 
material, and may move through this structure to resurface again at springs and wells. When a 
geologic structure yields usable quantities of water, it is designated an aquifer. The upper limit of 
this saturated area, referred to as the water table, exists where the liquid pressure generated by 
the presence of water, termed the hydraulic head, equals atmospheric pressure (USGS). 
Intuitively, as the volume of water contained within the structure decreases, the hydraulic head 
follows suit, and the water table declines. Of course, this conceptualization of a linear 
relationship between water table and content is a simplification; in some cases, aquifers retain 
water in deeper wells, preventing it from traveling upwards, and the estimation of how high the 
water in these sub-reservoirs would ascend if allowed to flow is termed the potentiometric 
surface (Freeze and Cherry, 1979).
Aquifers are described in terms of various interdependent properties, such as porosity, 
hydraulic conductivity, and geologic composition, and while a complete survey of these 
classification metrics exceeds the scope of this paper, additional terminology is explained as it 
becomes relevant.
A brief survey of the history of water management in the United States
In the U.S., the human right to exploit natural water resources, both surface and subsurface, has 
been defined legally by way of one of two different doctrines. The common law approach of 
riparian rights establishes a correlative dynamic, under which any land owner whose property is 
contiguous with a water-body is entitled to its consumptive and non-consumptive use, but not 
without accountability to other users entitled to the same. A different pattern of water law, 
denominated as prior appropriation, developed in the arid west, grants priority entitlements to 
those users who first accessed and made a claim to the resource. In practice, water systems have 
historically been regulated through some combination of these two frameworks in most states 
(Ostrom and Ostrom, 1972).
In order to appreciate the political and economic complexities that characterize water use 
and management throughout the country, it is necessary to consider the broad incentives that 
each paradigm creates when there is scarcity in the absence of regulation. Under a system of 
correlative or riparian rights, galvanized by the possibility of losing access in the future, users are 
likely to engage in myopic behavior, exploiting the reservoir as intensively as possible without 
considering the entitlements of other present and prospective users sharing the resource. Such a 
hold-out strategy has been popularized as the theory of the Tragedy of the Commons. On the 
other hand, without the network arrangement, a user who enjoys primary access of a diminishing 
water supply is motivated to eliminate the demands of users granted lower orders of 
appropriation (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1972, p. 7).
According to Ostrom and Ostrom (1972), “The structure of incentives inherent in the law 
of water rights is clearly not sufficient to constitute a variety of collective enterprises capable of
increasing the supply of water services available to a community of water users” (p. 8). Not to 
mention, this diagnosis predates the increasing environmental awareness for groundwater 
conservation, a type of use for which both legal approaches prove to be inadequate.
Due to their relative accessibility, surface waters have historically been exploited in 
greater measures than subterranean stocks, and for this reason, alternative policy frameworks 
first evolved for the conservation of stream-flows. As groundwater volumes have followed this 
trend (Megdal et al., 2014; Gleeson et al., 2012), and are increasingly managed through similar 
market mechanisms, a brief history of the institutional governance of instream flows illuminates 
the theoretical substrate that underlies modem aquifer supply management efforts.
The system of prior appropriation was first conceived as an extralegal arrangement in the 
19th century by gold prospectors seeking to divert flow away from streams. The doctrine was 
incorporated into state law throughout much of the west to better manage growing scarcity, 
precipitated by industrial development and burgeoning human populations. Under this system, 
states, not individual users, retained ownership of stream-flows, but granted appropriators 
usufruct rights of varying priority to utilize the resource (Scarborough, 2010, p. 3).
Before the end of the century, much of the natural stream-flow in western states was 
over-appropriated to what states designated ‘beneficial’ use, which consisted almost entirely of 
offstream diversions for mining, agriculture, industrial, or municipal applications, with no 
entitlements for instream users, such as environmentalists and recreationists. Initial policy 
solutions to supplement water quantity proved either to be unsustainably expensive and 
environmentally deleterious, such as supply augmenting damming projects (Chong and Sunding, 
2006; Scarborough, 2010; Colby, 2000), or politically untenable and ecologically uninformed, 
such as administratively calculated minimum instream flow requirements achieved through
moratoriums on new offstream diversions (Scarborough, 2010). Texas, a state examined later in 
this paper, has historically addressed issues of scarcity
“by building reservoirs and dams, diverting more water from rivers and lakes, and 
pumping more groundwater. These are no longer viable solutions, physically or 
economically... Surface water is over-allocated in the majority of the state.
Aquifer levels are rapidly declining, resulting in negative externalities like 
decreased springflow, land subsidence, and increased costs of drilling deeper 
wells” (Ballew, 2014).
Despite research findings that a re-appropriation of water entitlements from agricultural to urban 
use would be more economically judicious than new reservoir development and water 
augmentation projects, federal support for such financially exhaustive programs ceased only in
the 1980s (Colby, 2000).
From a conservation perspective, a principal deficiency in the doctrinal underpinnings of 
U S. water law seems to be that it was developed primarily to superintend and economize human 
access, that is “In the sense that form follows function, rights in water have evolved to ensure 
that societies’ needs are met” (DuMars and Minier, 2004), without much consideration for the 
environmental consequences of overexploitation. Both paradigms discussed above seem to have 
historically favored agricultural and industrial use and have generated incentives to overexploit; 
indeed, early cases of adjudication in England regarding water (this being relevant as the 
riparian, or correlative rights doctrine is a Common Law import), “spoke not in terms of what 
one could do with the resource as a matter of right, but rather what one could not do to others in
the use of the right” (DuMars and Minier, 2004). Some analysts have proffered that, without a 
trading provision, prior appropriation may not be able to offer any compelling reason to users to 
conserve or, in the case of agrarian applications, re-examine crop choice (Chong and Sunding, 
2006).
As environmental concerns for the preservation of both surface and groundwater escalate, 
the need for a reorientation of the human relationship with natural water resources has become 
increasingly exigent.
This is as valid of an assertion for groundwater as it is for surface resources. Subterranean 
reserves yield roughly 50% of global drinking supply and 43% of global irrigation supply (van 
der Gun, 2012), and while aquifers are often more capacious than surface reservoirs (Wheeler et 
al., 2016), their finitude is progressively made more evident across the world by overdraft. 
Gleeson et al. (2012), compute the total sum of the water balance between inflows and outflows 
for a set of large, hydrologically active aquifers, and estimate that the global groundwater 
footprint, or “the area required to sustain groundwater use and groundwater-dependent 
ecosystem services of a region of interest, such as an aquifer, watershed or community” (p. 197) 
is —3.5 times the actual area of the aquifers examined. Even if environmental flows are 
expropriated, the footprint remains -2  times the area. The researchers further calculate the ratio 
of global consumption to the global recharge net the global environmental stream-flow as ~0.2, 
and caution that “1.7 ± 0.4 billion people live in regions.. where groundwater consumption 
could affect groundwater availability and/or groundwater-dependent surface water and 
ecosystems in the future” (p. 199).
Water markets and their economic justifications
As global water resources are depleted at a disquieting rate, and demand in the U.S. shifts 
from agricultural to urban and environmental uses, queuing based appropriation measures 
without any arrangements for rights trading lead to inefficient distributions of a finite resource 
and limited adoption of capital intensive conservation options. Chong and Sunding (2006) 
provide a thought experiment to illustrate, assuming no externalities or transaction costs:
Suppose that a river has an average flow of 1 million AF; 850,000 AF of senior 
water rights are held by the agricultural (AG) district, and 150,000 AF are held by 
the urban (URB) district, which may have outside sources. With prior 
appropriation, allocation and pricing are not determined in a market 
context... [Suppose that in an average flow year without trade, the marginal values 
of water are $30 in the AG sector and $180 in the URB sector],. However, actual 
prices may be lower; prices are often set using the concept of cost recovery for an 
agricultural or urban district. If the price set in AG is less than $30, the quantity 
demanded at that price would be higher than 850,000 AF, and there would be an 
apparent shortage. Furthermore, the last acre-foot used by AG is worth only $30, 
but the last acre-foot used by URB is worth $180.. .A voluntary between the two 
sectors would increase welfare and lead to more economically efficient use.
“A second inefficiency stems from distribution in the event of a drought.
In a hypothetical drought year, the rive supply is 850,000 AF. URB would receive 
no water from the river, even though it values water more, whereas AG would 
receive its full allocation.. .A third in efficiency comes from the response to urban
growth. Suppose that urban growth expands the demand of URB.. The marginal 
value of water increases to $300.. .but the URB allocation remains fixed at 
150,000 AF. A final inefficiency has to do with conservation technology 
choice.. .Absent trade, the low price of water may cause AG to underadopt water­
saving irrigation technology (p. 244-246).
One of the more robust feature of the prior appropriation system has been the exchangeability of 
water rights from one user to another, so long as the transfer does not violate state requirements 
of beneficial use and non-injury to other users; this provision allows for the reallocation of finite 
volumes of water to other, potentially more welfare-enhancing applications (Scarborough, 2010). 
This right of transfer is one of the hallmark design features, and perhaps one of the more frequent 
arguments made in favor of market-based water resource management, such as cap-and-trade 
systems, which have come to replace the supply-side oriented federal projects (Hadjigeorgalis, 
2009).
In fact, Chong and Sunding (2006) aver that theoretically, that is to say, presuming no 
transaction costs and discounting any inadvertent effects on third-parties, a trading mechanism 
should preclude the four types of inefficiencies discussed above.
Proponents of markets as an alternative solution extol their efficiency and flexibility, 
arguing that negotiated transactions provide a transparent process to determine the price of water 
(Gao et al., 2016) and facilitate cost-effective processes leading to an optimal reallocation of 
property rights (Thompson et al., 2009). Cap-and-trade schemes specifically, some researchers 
contend, provide policymakers, who can establish a quantitative ceiling, a more lucid mechanism 
to reduce actual water use, as opposed to usage fees, which may only deter overexploitation to
varying degrees based on the price sensitivity of demand. The market may also, theoretically, 
adjust water price naturally, ushered by supply and demand dynamics, whereas fees or taxes are 
complicated by economic realities such as inflation (Baumol and Oates; 1988).
Further, as Chong and Sunding (2006) explain, “Trading helps equalize the marginal 
prices faced by various water users, thereby providing information about the value of water in 
alternative uses and creating compatible incentives” (p. 239).
Specifically examining the Nebraska Republic Basin, which researchers maintain is a fair 
representation of water resource issues in western states, Thompson et al. (2009) realize that in 
those cases where irrigation is the primary application of groundwater, and where the political 
intention is to reduce the total amount of water lost as evaporation or transpiration, capping 
pumping rights is likely to prove satisfactory. Moreover, their analysis finds that trading of water 
entitlements allocated under all quantitative caps currently deployed at or under consideration for 
their study area reduced consumptive use.
Market based mechanisms, which provide users economic incentives for better 
administration of natural resource stocks, have become some of the leading approaches to 
mitigate a variety of issues such as scarcity, contamination, the generation of externalities, and 
biodiversity loss. In the U.S., market solutions have been prescribed for the management of 
fisheries, air quality, freshwater, lead content in gasoline, and the release of ozone-depleting 
chemicals and nitrogen oxide (Colby, 2000).
Water markets have developed all over the world, reflecting varied priorities and 
accommodating regional economic, geographical, and political realities (Colby, 2000; Hung et 
al., 2014; Wheeler et al., 2016). In survey of groundwater governance conducted across all 50 
states and the District of Columbia, Gerlak et al. (2013) report that resource rights permitting is
the most prevalent of a number of complementary management strategies, relied upon by about 
88% of respondents (followed by monitoring at 84%, planning at 70%, designated protected 
areas at 54%, land use regulations at 36%, and extraction fees at 16%). This is a noteworthy 
statistic, due to the tradability of permits within cap-and-trade scheme architecture.
In the most elemental respects, water markets function quite like the markets for any 
other depletable resource; administrators, ideally informed by sufficient apposite scientific 
research, establish a total limit on water use (or in the case of groundwater, on withdrawals), and 
either auction or allocate rights, or permits, of varying priority to users, who may then trade these 
entitlements among themselves. In principle, these exchanges should allow for the redistribution 
of the initial allocation to their highest valued uses, increasing overall economic welfare (Dinar 
et al., 1997; Ballew, 2014; Heaney et al., 2006).
Ballew (2014) provides a simple, demonstrative example of the groundwater trading 
mechanism:
... consider a farmer and a nearby city within the same watershed. During a 
drought year in a market-based allocation system, the farmer would be 
incentivized to conserve the amount of water used to grow crops because he could 
sell his surplus water to the city [or to other users], making a profit greater than 
the profit he would make from growing his crops. During non-drought periods 
when water supply is greater, the farmer would keep his water, running farm 
operations as usual, and the city would turn back to its usual supply (p. 2).
The actualization of these benefits depends upon a set of conditions and market features, the 
most salient of which include the presence of: some critical mass of market participants, or 
economic agents, motivated by profit maximization; clearly elucidated rights to water, including 
a specification of term and total allowable withdrawal quantity, as well as any other constraints 
that may be deployed in special circumstances; low barriers to entry and low transaction costs 
associated with trading; perfect, complete, accurate, and accessible scientific information so that 
participants can make informed and rational purchase and sale decisions; metering technology 
that helps ascertain the volume of water withdrawn so that a register of available quantity can be 
accurately maintained; institutional stability, and a scientifically informed governance structure 
that designs regulation in a way such that conservation objectives can be met, guarantees 
consistent enforcement of rights, and communicates price information to participants (Dinar et 
al., 1997; Ballew, 2014).
Notwithstanding the theory that supports market based initiatives, a substantial body of 
research controverts claims about the natural efficacy of water marketing and permit trading, 
particularly as it is applied to groundwater management. Indeed, while they are growing in 
popularity, as of 2000, only four markets across the country with the volume of trading activity 
required to maintain stable pricing, and although the literature on water markets is rather 
extensive, it focuses primarily on surface-water trading (Chong and Sunding, 2006; Maddock 
and Haimes, 1975; Heaney et al., 2006; Colby, 2000; Skurray and Panned, 2012; Wheeler et al., 
2016; Hung et al., 2014).
At the most fundamental level, where cap-and-trade founders, the nonspecific diagnosis 
is poor design, which results in the establishment of an incomplete market, often itself a 
symptom of reductive thinking. The next section of this paper elaborates on the diagram below,








Sources of incomplete markets 
Reductive Thinking
In a 2008 study attempting to enumerate the global issues scientists from a variety of disciplines 
consider most exigent, a participant pool of 4,169 professors, postdoctoral fellows, and research 
staff members at Cornell University were asked to produce a list of crises and then rank them (on 
a scale of 1-5 of ascending magnitude) in terms of importance and solvability. Of the 116 unique 
problems identified, “Climate change and its effect on ecosystems” was ranked first in
importance, and “shortage of potable and clean water” was the only one that featured in the top 
ten for both importance and solvability (Cabrera et al., 2008).
The researchers, reflecting on the insights produced, diagnose a meta-crisis of thinking 
that contributes to our repeated practical failure when attempting to solve these problems, a 
symptom of both the harrowing combination of the time-sensitivity and complexity of these 
issues, and our inability to completely conceptualize their nuances when formulating solutions. 
Cabrera and Cabrera (2015) argue that our thinking is: reductive and preoccupied only with the 
parts of a compound problem rather than the whole; one-dimensionally hierarchical, and 
therefore rather obtuse when it comes to understanding more complex, distributive arrangements; 
dependent on static categories rather than part-whole couplings; rigidly linear and causal; 
imperceptive of dynamic relationships; and biased towards bivalent rather than multivalent logic. 
They assert, “Climate change, hunger, wealth distribution, and childhood obesity, while all 
legitimate crises, are not the root crisis. The root crisis is the way we think. That is the problem 
that underlies all the other problems” (p. 13-14). In other words, analysts of any problem are 
prone to oversimplification, patterned thinking, and a number of other types of logical fallacies 
and heuristics that lead them to suboptimal assessments.
A rather conspicuous example, as it relates to groundwater management: many of the 
earliest efforts to analyze optimal water withdrawals that conceived aquifers as subterranean 
bathtubs, physically homogenous underground stocks with consistent water tables and inter- 
structural pressure, compromised accuracy for mathematical simplicity (Athanassoglou et al., 
2009). In reality, these reservoirs are complex snarls of countless tunnels and apertures passing 
through geologic structures of varying porosity, each aquifer made distinct by multifarious 
hydrogeological idiosyncrasies.
It is a matter of paramount importance that, in order to operate effectively and without 
any unintended consequences, market mechanisms are designed accounting for these 
heterogeneities; indeed, put simply, water systems are dynamic, and the repercussions of human 
action that transforms the manner in which the systemic components interact are not always 
anticipatable. For these reasons, sustainable management schemes must not sunder the natural 
hydrogeological features of groundwater resources from economic and political phenomena.
The complex mechanisms of a groundwater system may be understood with more 
exactitude when studied within the coupled human and natural systems (CHANS) framework, a 
theoretical and directional tool for conservation research that seeks to bridge the gap between the 
natural and social sciences by moving beyond traditional conceptualizations of the nature-society 
dynamic in which the natural world was isolated from human socioeconomic considerations 
(Lassoie and Sherman, 2010).
Liu et al. (2007) explain CHANS in terms of a number of defining characteristics and 
principles, which can be condensed as follows:
Reciprocal effects and feedbacks
As humans exploit resources, they risk destabilizing or transforming the states in which their 
environment exists, thereby precipitating devastating natural processes. These human- 
environment interactions are patterned as negative or positive feedback loops.
Indirect Effects
The complicated arrangement of most CHANS, and their sometimes confounding components 
and interrelationships, renders them rather unpredictable, making it difficult to establish causal
relationships between two events or processes, or to anticipate fully the consequences of a 
particular interaction, development, or incident. The extinction of a keystone species, for 
instance, may propel broader trends that reconfigure an entire ecosystem.
Emergent Properties
Certain characteristics of CHANS exist only as a result of idiosyncratic inter-system processes, 
and it is important to understand the particular agents or entities that produce them, as well as 
their functional relationships. For example, “spatial distribution and quality of panda habitat 
result from human activities (e.g., timber harvesting, fuel wood consumption) and natural 
processes (e.g., forest succession)” (p. 641). If these relationships are better understood, 
management efforts can direct their limited resources with greater precision.
Vulnerability
This is a measure of the susceptibility of a CHANS to exogenous, detrimental uncontrollables, 
and can be conceptualized as either ‘outcome vulnerability,’ or a function of only the magnitude 
and nature of external hazards, or as ‘contextual vulnerability,’ that is, an extension of a pre­
existing state, an a priori condition that exists irrespective of any hazard (Shukla et al., 2016) but 
which determines the state-shift of a system. It is important to note that vulnerability is not 
determined simply by the natural durability of an environment; rather, as human agents are 
considered an inextricable part of any ecosystem, their social and infrastructural integrity is an 
important factor as well.
Once a system’s current state is compromised, it is important to consider the permanence of a 
shift, which is measured by resilience, or . .the ability of CHANS to retain similar structures 
and functioning after disturbances” and is a property that is additive, as “subtle losses of 
resilience can set the stage for sudden, surprising, and large changes in ecosystems that are 
difficult or impossible to reverse” (Liu et al., 2007, p. 641). The points at which these critical 
shifts occur are referred to as thresholds, or tipping points, and may often lead to rapid ecosystem 
collapse (Lassoie and Sherman, 2010).
The subsequent sections apply CHANS theory to the analysis of the computational, political, and 
economic sources of groundwater market failure.
Computational, or Modeling Issues
As Chong and Sunding (2006) state, a free-market allocation of rights does not offer an 
efficacious solution when managing nonstandard commodities such as water, which is a flow 
that circulates through the Earth’s hydrologic cycle. The volume of the resource that is available 
in any given stock, whether surface-level or subterranean, at any given time, depends upon 
innumerable variables, such as precipitation and the material structure of its reservoir.
Groundwater management is further complicated by the fact that “it is less visible 
[relative to surface water] and recharge is more difficult to measure than stream inflows. Also, 
the hydraulic interconnectedness between different aquifers and between aquifers and surface 
water is still not fully understood in many regions” (Wheeler et al., 2016, p. 494).
Therefore, in many instances, an aquifer exists as part of a more expansive system in 
which precipitation and return flows move through underground passages, across varying 
elevation and potentiometric pressures, supplying surface-level waterways, and this can generate 
some key feedback loops, indirect effects, and emergent behavior.
Within an interdependent water supply system, surface level extractions, even those 
diverted from stream-flow, may diminish subterranean volumes, and vice versa, and changes in 
upstream flow are not without consequence for downstream users (Jordan; Hartman and 
Seastone as cited in Hadjigeorgalis, 2009).
Not all use of water is consumptive, and in the case of certain types of use- such as for 
hydropower generation and recreation- some of the exploited resource is restored to the original 
stock by way of return flows. Trade of entitlements may result in a reorganization of the points 
of extraction, which can in turn diminish return flows, a key source of water for some users that 
are not consulted during the transaction (Merett as cited in Hadjigeorgalis, 2009).
Numerous repercussions of overdraft such as land subsidence, saltwater intrusion (Wang 
et al. as cited in Hadjigeorgalis, 2009) and mineral leaching may interact to initiate feedback 
loops, decreasing usable resources at a faster rate than projected as based on historic drawdown. 
The convergence of these phenomena has the potential to breach hydrogeological thresholds, 
beyond which feedback loops of even more considerable magnitude, occurring across greater 
spatial and temporal scales, can further accelerate depletion and produce presently unpredictable 
emergent trends.
For the sake of most applications, whether municipal or environmental, a diminution in 
water quality has essentially the same effect as a reduction in quantity, as degradation can render 
the resource unsuitable for consumption. Vulnerability of any stock or flow to pollution is also
inconstant, and depends on pedological and edaphological properties, geographical location, the 
human use of chemicals such as fertilizers and pesticides, and the disposal of waste (Wheeler et 
al., 2016).
Often times the nuances of this systemic behavior, with all of its constituent 
interdependencies, are neglected for the sake of easily delimiting administrative boundaries and 
jurisdictions. Even if the political will exists, and despite great advances in the field of 
hydrologic modeling (which now makes use of sophisticated software tools such as MODFLOW 
to solve complex groundwater flow equations), it is difficult to accurately simulate tortuous 
hydrogeological structures; the governing partial differential equation utilized by the 
MODFLOW program takes a number of factors into consideration, such as hydraulic 
conductivity in three dimensions, potentiometric head, volumetric flux, storage of the porous 
material, and time, but may not be able to anticipate more dynamic emergent patterns and 
feedback loops.
Economic Assumptions
The economic justifications for cap-and-trade, such as the redistribution of a limited 
resource to its most efficient users, are predicated on the economic theory of Coasian 
bargaining*, which argues broadly that if property rights to a resource are fully and clearly 
defined, and if the transaction costs concomitant with their trade are negligible or nil, and if 
economic participants have access to complete information, then the problem of externalities 
generated by pollution, or the consumption of a limited natural resource (such as clean air, or by 
extension, some volume of clean water) can be mitigated.
*In reality, the true internalization of externalities by way of Coasian bargaining is conditional on a set of 
unrealistic economic conditions. See “The Problem of Social Cost” by Ronald Coase (1960).
In such an ideal scenario, agents inflicted by an externality can bargain with the 
producers of the externality until all parties are satisfied, and it should not theoretically matter to 
whom the property rights are initially granted as redistribution will occur until some Pareto 
optimal equilibrium is achieved (Coase, 1960; Baumol. and Oates, 1988).
However, the unique properties of groundwater described above contribute to making the 
management of these systems a problem that may not be best addressed by Coasian solutions. 
Some potential problems of entitlement transfer include:
• Redistribution: Transfers can cause the spatial and temporal redistribution of 
the impacts of groundwater extraction
• Concentration: Groundwater transfers can cause the spatial concentration of 
extraction, thus potentially concentrating and compounding its impacts at 
particular locations
• Transformation: Impacts of groundwater extraction may differ in their nature 
and extent between the original and newly-transferred locations
• Uncertainty: Negative effects from groundwater transfers may be uncertain 
(Skurray and Panned, 2012, p. 880).
Heaney et al. (2006) caution that in the absence of completely defined property rights, trade of 
entitlements may create negative effects for parties not directly involved in the transfer; these are 
referred to as third-party effects. Skurray and Panned (2012) further corroborate this argument, 
writing that “the wide range of impacts from groundwater extraction, and their potentially wide
spatial extent, mean that their costs may be born by an equally wide range of third parties” (p. 
881).
Although the literature on these effects is expansive, for the purpose of defining and 
expounding the theory of confounding externalities, which is one of the objectives of this section 
of the paper, a subset of all third-party impacts is reviewed.
First, a spatial redistribution of permits may unexpectedly reduce the quantity or 
reliability of water supply. Fleaney et al. (2006), examining the southern Murray-Darling Basin 
in Australia, write illustratively:
... entitlements are defined at the point of delivery. The number of potential 
sources from which these delivery points can be supplied increases moving 
downstream as the effective catchment area increased with tributary inflows.
Unless traded entitlements retain the features of the reliability of supply from the 
exporting catchment, net trade that spans one or more tributaries can affect the 
reliability of the entitlement in both the source and the destination regions. If 
water is traded upstream of a tributary, a given pool of resources may be spread 
over a greater number of users, thus decreasing supply reliability for those users.
At the same time, there is an increase in the share of resources that is potentially 
available to users below the tributary (p. 281).
Adapting this argument to groundwater, a straight, free-market transfer of the right to pump from 
one location to another does not account for the hydrogeological inconsistency of the 
subterranean reservoir system, and it may be that the ease with which water can be exhumed 
from the earth varies between the two geographical points. Therefore, in order to guarantee
volumetric reliability, it is critical to determine whether the permits should be defined at the 
point of origin or delivery, and to carefully consider spatial heterogeneity.
Second, the monetary value of a permit, which is somewhat one-dimensionally realized at 
the intersection of supply and demand in an open market, may not reflect the degradation or 
improvement of water quality, which is partially a function of the quality of return flows. If 
pumping activity shifts to a type of application that increases salinity and toxicity, such as 
irrigative use that relies heavily on fertilizers, pesticides and insecticides while creating 
significant return flows, the transfer has generated an externality by reducing the general regional 
quality of the resource as well as the volumetric availability of usable water.
For many aquifers, drawdown naturally reduces water quality as it increases mineral 
leaching, but the anthropogenic introduction of noxious chemicals can create positive feedback 
loops and indirect effects across larger regions than can be anticipated. Further, as the 
hydrogeology of an underground basin is location-specific, it is crucial to have users understand 
the full consequences of rearranging the points of origin and destination (Skurray and Panned, 
2012; Healey et al., 2006; Hung et al., 2014).
The market value of permits also neglects the temporal aspects of present groundwater 
use, as time-lagged effects (a sort of emergent trend) in larger, less transmissive aquifers can 
significantly reduce the available supply in the future, increasing pumping costs (Skurray and 
Panned, 2012).
Finally, trade can impose a cost on non-sentient entities such as the environment, or non­
human species, and it is not possible to integrate the priorities of those parties in a Coasian 
bargaining program (save for an indirect representation as reflected in the priorities of 
environmentalists and recreationists) as they obviously cannot be satisfied with monetary
remuneration, and the total impact of the externalities on these other agents may be difficult to 
monetize (Skurray and Panned, 2012).
For these reasons, it may be argued that it is quite impossible to achieve the conditions 
requisite to realize the benefits of a Coasian scheme as it is applied to groundwater; as permit 
prices reflect only the economic valuation of water vis-a-vis human demand, they are ipso facto 
unable to capture many of the nuances that factor into resource availability or scarcity. The result 
is an incomplete market that suffers from information asymmetries, transaction costs, and 
nebulous property rights.
This is not to completely discount the economic rationalization for trading, which does 
provide a mechanism through which human third-party interests or representatives of non-human 
third-party interests can work to reallocate use. For example, if the superintending agency 
identifies an environmentally sensitive area, it may actively engage in trade or create incentives 
using a menu of policy instruments to relocate pumping. Without the ability to transfer rights, the 
spatial pattern of usage remains static regardless of its negative impacts (Skurray and Panned, 
2012). It is important to note however, that this correction cannot occur without some measure of 
regulation.
Political Complexities
The construction of a sustainably and efficiently operating cap-and-trade scheme is quite a 
multidimensional political problem. Policymakers face the arduous task of establishing an 
effective, economically infrangible, socially equitable, and environmentally innocuous 
institutional arrangement. Some major considerations include:
(1) who may claim [the resource] and for what uses or purposes, (2) 
exclusiveness or jointness of use, (3) exposure to the claims of others, (4) 
stability or perishability of the right over time, (5) transferability of the right,
(6) burden for bearing the costs or risks of adversity, and (7) the structure of 
authoritative arrangements for reaching and enforcing determinations in 
relation to conflicts of interest between individual users and among 
communities of water users (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1972, p. 6).
Colby (2000) expounds the process of design that precedes the establishment of rights, which 
commences with a determination of a maximum limit on how much water can be exploited 
within a temporal frame. This initial estimation, which must be realized at the fountainhead of 
the entire venture, is already a scientifically perplexing assignment due to the hydrogeological 
uncertainties and attendant economic complications described in the previous sections. If a cap is 
set without sufficient scientific research, the probability of unanticipated repercussions rises 
significantly, and it is unlikely that the superintending agency will be able to furnish accurate 
information regarding aquifer capacity and optimal groundwater use, a requisite condition of a 
complete market.
The pattern of the original distribution of entitlements must also be scrutinized, as 
political incentives may be misaligned with social, environmental, or economic objectives. As an 
extension of the prior appropriation doctrine, water markets often prioritize the needs of users 
who have demonstrated beneficial use over some period of time in the past; at the Edwards 
Aquifer, for example, initial allocations were granted to applicants who made such use in any 
given calendar year within the historical timeframe 1972-1999; this was followed by a rather
tempestuous period during which numerous parties- including environmentalists, galvanized by 
the concern that water was over-appropriated, as well as other users, who felt that the allotments 
were inequitable- filed objections (Colby, 2000). Such litigatory episodes are expensive, and are 
likely to engender a fissiparous political and social environment.
Some researchers maintain that auctioning initial permits may be a more advisable 
alternative to free allocation. James P. Barrett, regarding the dispensation of carbon permits 
under a cap-and-trade system, defends this position unequivocally, avouching that “Under 
grandfather, polluters receive a lump-sum distribution of valuable assets. This represents a pure 
wealth transfer from energy consumers to energy producers. There is no incentive attached to 
this transfer, and thus produces little or no change in marginal behavior.. (Barrett, 2009).
Permit auctions generate revenue for the government, which can capitalize a variety of 
economically productive policies, such as the reduction of taxes to encourage enterprise, or the 
subsidization of new technology development. Regarding this, Barrett (2009) asserts:
Energy efficiency falls into a class of goods called ‘public goods,’ i.e., goods that 
can be consumed by more than one person simultaneously. Markets tend to yield 
suboptimal investments in efficiency research and development. Using auction 
revenues to fund energy efficiency, or any other public good for that matter, 
would produce economic gains. The increase in energy prices would increase the 
economic return to energy efficiency, all else equal.
Here, an analogue argument can be constructed for groundwater rights. Erosion of economic and 
agricultural activity is amongst the most common grievances lodged against the regulation of
water use (Colby, 2000), and while the market should redistribute access to those rights-holders 
who make the most efficient use of their entitlements, a review of permit exchanges reveals that 
trading activity seldom emulates theory.
Perhaps the most intractable of political problems is that of consensus-building amongst 
numerous stakeholders and claimants. Administrators must attempt to achieve some equilibrium 
with the inconsonant interests of direct resource users, environmental advocates, policymakers, 
competing claimants such as new market entrants and aboriginal groups, regulators such as 
fisheries services and the EPA, and economically linked entities such as agriculture-dependent 
counties and recreationist-dependent businesses (Colby, 2000).
Often, additional considerations must be made as to how the scheme will be restructured 
in extraordinary circumstances, such as drought, during which time managing rival interests may 
become even more difficult.
In some places, such as Texas (a point revisited with the Edwards Aquifer case study), 
surface and underground flows are legally regarded as different entities, and are managed by 
different agencies, despite the physical interconnections. This sort of distinction often reflects 
entrenched political and social cultures, which are difficult to revise, but will regardless limit the 
accuracy of simulation and optimization modeling, as well as the ability of administrators to 
predict indirect effects of dissonant policy decisions.
Then there is the matter of defining objectives. Research in favor of permit trading 
reasons that it is the most cost-effective route towards Pareto optimality, or socially optimal 
allocation, and so this is often the theoretical underpinning behind cap-and-trade schemes 
(Chong and Sunding, 2006). This should not always be the policymaker’s intention, however, as 
Pareto efficiency implies that the priorities of all considered agents are best satisfied, but not that
the priorities of all impacted agents are. As stated at numerous points in this paper, these agents 
have included environmentalists and recreationists in the past, and now may include the 
environment itself, or other species.
As the political contours within which a market operates are a critical determinant of the 
economic dynamics of water management, which in turn can significantly transform 
hydrogeological and ecological structures, it can be argued that the absence of a secure 
institutional and political context is closely related to a growth of systemic vulnerabilities. That 
is to say, if legislators fail to bear in mind the priorities of a diversity of stakeholders (including 
the environment’s entitlement to sustain its natural functions and guarantee habitat for other 
species), or if they do not prioritize the right objectives, or if they do not holistically assess the 
economic and natural dimensions of their jurisdiction, or if they do not lucidly define property 
rights, or if they do not preemptively outline plans for extraordinary scenarios, or if they 
inadvertently create incongruous incentives, they may promote contextual vulnerability.
Confounding Externalities
Reductive thinking- which relies on oversimplifying economic assumptions, does not 
holistically assess political complexities, and is constrained by computational difficulties- 
foments poor policies which have a high potential for constructing an incomplete market 
besieged by third-party effects. A specific group of these effects, referred to in this paper as 
confounding externalities, consists of those externalities that are, ironically, created by policy 
efforts to internalize existing externalities. These recursive externalities result directly from the 
limitations of extant economic solutions in managing the indirect, heterogeneous spatial and 
temporal effects of trading water over geographical space.
As a simple expository thought experiment, consider a cap-and-trade scheme for 
groundwater located in a region characterized by an inconstant topography of varying elevation. 
The subterranean reservoir is a carbonate-rock structure characterized by some medium level of 
porosity and permeability; in certain areas, water travels unimpeded, as if through a sponge, and 
in other places, it is confined by relatively impermeable rock. Water rights trades occur in a free 
market, with no arbiter to determine prices, and no directive regulation. The permits, which are 
allocated by some sort of grandfathering process, are subject to temporal and use restrictions 
(that is, they can be temporarily leased or permanently transferred, and must specify either 
agricultural, municipal, or industrial application). It is speculated that, in accordance with the 
Coase theorem, the initial permit spread will self-restructure to maximize social welfare as 
trading occurs. The superintending agency provides data on past transactions so that individuals 
wishing to bargain for an entitlement can predicate their positions on historic pricing. As is the 
case with most water markets, trading across applications, such as from irrigative to municipal 
use, is rare as most users value their collective type of use. Agricultural agents in particular are 
hesitant to allow their grandfathered rights to shift to municipal or industrial use, as that may 
precipitate a future shortage of supply for irrigative use. One of the administrative objectives of 
the scheme is to limit total annual drawdown so as to maintain some amount of natural discharge 
at wells.
Two market participants, agricultural users D and U, decide to engage in a trade. The 
former, who lives at a relatively lower elevation, wishes to permanently sell x acre-feet of her 
allocation to the latter. They bargain, referring to the ledger of past trades, and arrive at a mutual 
agreement that a payment of Px, where P is some dollar value, made by U to D is an appropriate 
remittance. Sometime after the trade occurs however, agent D realizes that there is significantly
less volume of water available within her wells than she anticipated; the total drawdown is in fact 
a volume of x+y acre-feet. Not only this, a number of other groundwater dependents in D’s 
vicinity, as well as those downstream, also experience a decline in natural discharge.
What has happened is this: A shift in pumping to a higher elevation (from user D’s wells 
to user U’s wells) has reduced hydrostatic pressure within the aquifer system; as more water is 
drawn at greater altitudes, there is a decrease in the total weight of the liquid exerting pressure on 
intra-system flows from above, and therefore a concomitant diminution in the volume of water 
that is naturally pushed upwards to wells at lower altitudes. Further, as D has decreased her total 
groundwater use by x, she has also limited her contribution of return flows by some proportion of 
x, and some users further downstream who relied on these flows can no longer access them.
As U and D bargained, they relied on some idea of a mean market price for water in their 
region based on historic trends, but what they failed to anticipate are the idiosyncratic 
hydrogeological elements of their particular trade. In this market, the price of water is a 
reflection of aggregate human valuation based on supply and demand, and the trade between D 
and U is theoretically a welfare improving transaction; as water moves to a higher value use it 
should reduce associated externalities. In reality, reductive thinking evident in market design has 
neglected dynamic system properties, and the monetary appraisal of x acre feet of water at the 
sale price of Px is an inaccurate pricing of the resource, which should in fact have been 
P(x+y+o), where x+y is the total supply shortage D experiences as a result of a change in 
hydrostatic pressure, and o is the total supply shortage all other users experience as a result of a 
change in pressure as well as in return flows.
Although this is a rather uncomplicated exemplification, this general principle of 
confounding externalities can be applied to further gradations of problems related to the 
unanticipated, heterogeneous effects of trading water over a heterogeneous landscape.
The final two sections of this paper are a systems-based examination of the Edwards, a 
high-yielding aquifer in central Texas, featuring an interview with Marc Friberg, an executive at 
the chief groundwater superintending agency on-site, followed by a survey of alternative 
groundwater management instruments that may mitigate the problem of confounding 
externalities.
Edwards Aquifer Case Study 
Hydrogeological Details
The Balcones Fault Zone Edwards Aquifer is a highly porous, honeycombed, underground water 
system that lies within the Edwards Plateau, a region in west-central Texas. Water within the 
Edwards, referred to as such, or as the EA, in this paper, passes through a complex underground 
structure at very high speeds, eventually moving up due to hydraulic pressure and discharging at 
wells and natural springs; for these unique hydrogeological properties, it is considered a karstian 
artesian aquifer (these are topographical terms used to describe a landscape characterized by 
subterranean sinkholes and caves, formed of limestone, gypsum, and dolomite). This formation, 
which is considered one of the most productive basins in the U.S., spans a 4,350 square mile area 
and underlies parts of 11 counties. The aquifer is the primary source of water for approximately 
two million people who reside within and around its boundaries, in the City of San Antonio, as 
well as for downstream users in the Nueces, San Antonio, Guadalupe, and San Marcos river 
basins. It also provides habitat for numerous aquatic and subterranean species (Eckhardt).
The San Antonio segment of the system is confined by groundwater divides at the cities 
of Brackettville in the south-west and Kyle in the north-east, between which it arches for a 
distance of roughly 180 miles, and consists of three major contiguous regions: the catchment, or 
contributing zone, where the densely wooded land surface captures rainfall; the recharge zone, 
where runoff from the contributing zone falls through fractured limestone into the aquifer; and 
the artesian zone, a porous limestone formation in which the water is stored and through which it 
moves by way of faults, tunnels, and other interstices (Eckhardt).
Roughly 75-80% of the EA’s water replenishment is allogenic recharge, which occurs 
when water runoff from the catchment area flows in streams and rivers and sinks into faults 
along the recharge zone surface. Other sources include precipitation that falls directly on the 
recharge zone, referred to as autogenic recharge; surface water reservoirs; and neighboring 
groundwater systems such as the Trinity aquifer. While the volume of annual allogenic and 
autogenic recharge may vary greatly from one year to the next, the median for the period from 
1934 through 2014 was 556,100 acre-feet, with the lowest measurement recorded at 43,700 acre- 
feet during a severe drought in 1956, and the highest at 2,486,000 acre-feet in 1992. It is not 
certain how much water enters the Edwards through inter-formational flow, such as from other 
adjacent aquifers, and estimates range from 5,000 to 60,000 acre-feet per year (2010-2015 
Groundwater Management Plan, p. 18). The system is also marked by sinkholes and caves, 
which can absorb large volumes of recharge.
Once the water flows down gradient into the artesian zone, it is captured within a highly 
porous, and typically karstian structure of rock matrices, conduits, and caves between the 
relatively impermeable Del Rio Clay below and Upper Glen Rose limestone formation above. 
Here, water can sink to depths of 3,400 feet below the surface. As is the case with artesian
aquifers, when new recharge enters the structure it applies immense hydraulic pressure on the 
stored stock, which consequently rises upward through pores and natural tunnels to achieve 
hydrostatic equilibrium, and is eventually discharged at wells and springs. Due to its 
permeability, high volumes of water move into and through the Edwards relatively unimpeded, 
and hence aquifer levels are quite sensitive to recharge (Eckhardt).
While most of the Edwards carries freshwater, a deeper portion of the reservoir along its 
southern and eastern edges is less pervious and so water stored here over a high residence period 
absorbs minerals from the surrounding limestone and becomes saline. In this area, freshwater 
typically flows closer to the surface while saltwater is contained deeper underground, and the 
two converge along an interface colloquially referred to as the “Bad Water” line. If the aquifer is 
overdrawn, the more saline water (considered non-potable when the concentration of its 
dissolved solids exceeds 1,000 parts-per-million) may move further up, adulterating the 
freshwater and further reducing the total potable volume available. However, a number of studies 
have reassured that such contamination, if it does occur, will likely be temporary, as new 
recharge will force the saltwater back down (Eckhardt). The residence time of the water within 
the aquifer, which determines its salinity, varies from a few hours to several years, and depends 
on a number of factors including depth and location (Tremallo et al., 2015).
Groundwater is either naturally discharged from springs, many of which are clustered 
within the Comal and San Marcos systems, or withdrawn from drilled wells. While the former is 
used primarily for the recreational economies in the Cities of Braunfels and San Marcos, the 
latter provides a significant amount of the agricultural, municipal, and industrial supply in south- 
central Texas (Tremallo et al., 2015).
Although it is difficult to determine the aquifer’s total capacity precisely, due to its 
complex geology, estimates based on effective porosity, or the percentage of total pores that are 
connected to other pores allowing water to travel through the structure and up to wells and 
springs, fall somewhere around 19.5 million acre-feet of stored water in the confined freshwater 
zone (Maclay and Small, 1984), 45 million acre-feet of circulating freshwater (38 million acre- 
feet in the confined area and 7 million acre-feet in the unconfined region) (Maclay and Small, 
1995). More generous estimates speculate that the total volume of water in the confined portion 
may be as high as 157 acre-feet (Hovorka et al., 1996)
Practically, however, the amount of groundwater available is much lower, as the 
complicated relationship between depth, recharge, and hydraulic pressure determine how much 
water is discharged at natural springs, and withdrawing water from deeper within the system is 
generally cost prohibitive (Eckhardt).
Statistics reporting the volume of aquifer water use by county were initially furnished by 
the United States Geological Survey from the 1950s till the late 1990s, and then the Authority 
hence. Estimates of annual total groundwater discharge for the period of record 1934-2014, 
which consists of both spring-flow and well-water withdrawn, range from -388,800 acre-feet 
recorded in 1955, to -1,130,000 acre-feet in 1992, with the mean and median figures at -687,000 
acre-feet and -694,100 acre-feet, respectively.
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(Graph created with data provided in the Edwards Aquifer Authority Hydrologic Data report for 2014, published in
November 2015)
Spring-flow discharge is determined by measuring downstream-flows with electronic data 
loggers at Leona, Hueco, Comal, and San Marcos springs, and periodically also at San Pedro and 
San Antonio springs. Data for the period of record 1934-2014 ranges from the low of -69,800 
acre-feet measured in 1956, to the high of —802,800 acre-feet in 1992, with the mean and median 
figures at -375,800 acre-feet and -379,000 acre-feet, respectively.
Annual Total Spring-flow Discharge at 
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The mean natural discharge at the San Marcos springs system during the period of record 1940- 
2009 was -164 cfs, and the minimum of 46 cfs occurred in 1956. The mean for the Comal 
springs system during the period of record 1927-2009 was -291 cfs, and the minimum occurred 
when the system ceased to flow for 144 consecutive days in 1956 (EARIP, 2009).
Total well-water withdrawn consists of an estimate of unreported discharge from 
unpermitted wells (such as for domestic, livestock, or federal facility use) and a measurement of 
reported discharge from metered wells. Data for the period of record 1934-2014 indicates that 
the total volume of well-water withdrawn has generally increased steadily over the years, 
presumably due to increasing population, as well as agricultural and industrial activity, and the 
median and mean are -329,400 acre-feet and -315,300 acre-feet respectively.
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Projections of future water demand, based on projections of population growth in the 
jurisdictional area sourced from the 1998 Groundwater Management Plan and the January 2006
South Central Texas Regional Water Planning Area Regional Water Plan, estimate municipal use 
to grow from 314,000 acre-feet per year to 488,000 acre-feet per year, and industrial use from 
32,798 acre-feet per year in 2010 to 52,377 acre-feet per year in 2060, but for irrigation use to 
fall from 129,299 acre-feet per year in 2010 to 104,863 acre-feet per year in 2060 (Groundwater 
Management Plan 2010-2015), which is consistent with the notion that a more productive 
reallocation will lead from to be divested away from agricultural use and towards municipal and 
industrial uses (Debaere and Tianshu, 2016).
Administrative Structure and Governance History
Groundwater and surface water are considered separate legal entities in Texas, and while 
the former is managed through a number of groundwater districts, which submit Groundwater 
Management Plans to the Texas Water Development Board, the latter is typically regulated by 
the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality through river authorities. Though its use may 
be regulated by the government, groundwater is considered property of the permitted user, an 
extension of the Common Law import of the rule o f capture, which awards ownership of a 
natural resource to the first user to capture it. On the other hand, surface water is legally the 
property of the State of Texas. While conjunctive management procedures have not been 
formalized, different regulatory authorities do attempt to cooperate when making policy 
decisions, especially regarding future use. The Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA, or 
alternatively, the Authority), the management agency entrusted with groundwater management at 
Edwards, has jurisdiction over the recharge and artesian regions, and only a small section of the 
catchment area (Eckhardt; Friberg, 2016).
As per the Edwards Aquifer Act, the prevailing legal directive created by the Texas Legislature 
to conserve groundwater at the site, the Authority’s regulatory domain is limited exclusively to 
subterranean flows; as water emerges at any orifice, the appropriate legal and governance 
structure changes hands (Friberg, 2016).
Following a ten-year drought, the Texas Legislature established the Edwards 
Underground Water District (EUWD) in 1959 to monitor the aquifer and support conservation, 
but granted it no authority to limit the quantity of water pumped. For decades the EUWD 
surveyed the Edwards and argued that reducing withdrawals is a requisite for sustainable 
groundwater use, but state legislators were disinclined to sanction such authority until finally, in 
1991, a group of environmental interests, galvanized by the increasing number of endangered 
species at Edwards, litigated against the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), 
claiming that the defendant failed to execute ecological and wildlife preservation duties assigned 
to it under the Endangered Species Act. This lawsuit led to the passage of Texas Senate Bill 
1477, also known as the EAA Act, a legislative milestone that authorized the state government to 
regulate withdrawals from the aquifer by mandating that user rights to groundwater be permitted. 
The Act required that the State of Texas maintain continuous flow at Comal and San Marcos 
springs at some minimum level adequate to protect endangered species to the federally mandated 
extent. To this end, it created the Edwards Aquifer Authority as the primary steward of the 
aquifer’s groundwater. The Authority drafts and executes groundwater management and strategic 
plans, monitors water quality, availability and compliance, and coordinates with a number of 
regional, state, and federal authorities and agencies to carry out different programs. While it has 
been required to review and submit its Groundwater Management Plan (GMP), which expounds 
its strategy to achieve these deliverables, to the Texas Water Development Board every five
years heretofore, as of the current Texas congressional session it no longer needs to seek 
legislative approval, and can continue operations independently (Colby, 2000; Friberg, 2016).
Initial goals for the EAA included limiting total water withdrawn to 450,000 acre-feet per 
year, to be achieved by 2004, and 400,000 acre-feet by 2008. These targets, suggested by the 
USFWS, were in accordance with what was determined to be an adequate level of water retained 
within the Edwards to support endangered species at times of record scarcity, benchmarked 
against rainfall during the ten-year drought.
The Authority commenced operations in 1996 and allocated the first set of permits based 
on historical use rates to applicants who paid the necessary application and registration fees 
(which, as per the Act, are not to exceed $25 and $10 per application, respectively) and 
demonstrated, through corroborating documentation, that they had beneficially used aquifer 
supply in any one year within the 1973-1993 period. The number of applications for this year, for 
800,000 acre-feet of groundwater, were much higher than expected (Friberg, 2016) and the 1996 
allocation of 549,000 acre-feet, although generous, was still restrictive (Colby, 2000). While this 
could have been inimical to conservation efforts, a large number of the 881 permits issued 
ultimately went unutilized.
In 2007, the annual cap was revised to 572,000 acre-feet, reflecting the volume of 
groundwater covered by permits outstanding, as it was determined by the USFWS and the 
Edwards Aquifer Recovery Implementation Program (EARIP) that as long as additional Habitat 
Conservation Plans (HCP) are initiated, this figure is sufficient to maintain minimum spring-flow 
levels and preserve covered wildlife (Friberg, 2016).
Permitted aquifer water, measured in acre-feet per year, is withdrawn from the Uvalde 
pool in the south-east, and the San Antonio pool in the metropolitan region. As the purpose of
regulation at Edwards is to safeguard spring-flow, which is contingent on the hydrostatic 
pressure of a certain amount of water within the aquifer, this volume-based unit is relevant. 
Municipal, agricultural, and industrial users operating non-exempt, metered wells, are allocated 
rights to pump water from one of these two pools, based on their geographical location, and are 
required to record their water withdrawals monthly, report usage annually, pay management fees, 
and practice prescribed or voluntary conservation strategies. Total fees due are calculated on a 
per-acre foot basis for different types of use. For example, as per the Act, the rate for agricultural 
use is to be under $2 per acre-foot withdrawn. Water districts within the jurisdiction of the EAA 
may also contract with the Authority to pay fees through taxes instead of individual user 
payments (EAA Act).
The authority issues three types of water rights: regular permits, which provide 
uninterruptible access and have no term limits, remaining in effect until they are cancelled; term 
permits, which allow interruptible access, that is, access conditional on water level readings at 
index wells and flow volume at the two major springs, for a period of time not exceeding ten 
years; and emergency permits, which are issued only to prevent critical health and safety threats, 
and have renewable terms of 30 days. In a sense this system favors existing users, as additional 
regular and term permits are only issued to allocate rights to the amount of capped water that 
remains beyond what has already been permitted. Indeed, the entitlements issued in 1996 that 
granted existing users access to their respective historic volumes of water were regular permits 
with no term limits, and so these initial permit holders have enjoyed a degree of seniority.
Permit-holders can engage in voluntary trades, either to permanently transfer their water 
rights or to lease them out over a specified period of time, and have a great deal of latitude as to 
how to structure the transaction; they may sell or lease all or any portion of their entitlements at
any price they deem appropriate. While the Authority reassures that there are unlikely to be any 
detrimental or heterogeneous hydrogeological effects of pumping over space, analysis conducted 
by the EARIP did conclude that decreasing pumping near the spring systems has a positive 
impact on flow volumes, particularly in the case of San Marcos. As such, when the Authority 
realized that a number of transfers occurring between 2007 and 2009 enabled pumping to be 
localized around the springs in the eastern region of its jurisdiction, it passed the only major local 
constraint, colloquially referred to as the Cibolo Creek Rule, which restricts water users to the 
West of Cibolo Creek in Bexar County from selling their entitlements to those East of it (Friberg, 
2016).
The EAA provides access to, but does not maintain, an online trading platform which 
lists all water permits for sale, along with seller contact information, permit number, minimum 
and maximum acre-feet for sale, transfer type, and contract lengths. Analysis of transfer records 
published by the authority indicate that over the period 1998-2012, an average of 75.8% of total 
trading can be attributed to leasing, that an average trade transacted about 37,500 acre-feet of 
water, and that prices were rather volatile, fluctuating between $80 per acre-feet to $6,000 per 
acre-feet.
While, consistent with the notion that water markets lead to a more efficient reallocation 
of resource rights, trading tended to increase during periods of water scarcity, a majority of the 
transfers at Edwards have occurred between agricultural users and not from agricultural uses to 
municipal or industrial uses. Furthermore, on average only about 8% of the total issues permitted 
were transferred.
Generally speaking, all wells within the regional domain of the authority must be 
registered, have meters installed, and permits must be granted for any water withdrawn from
them. However, a well may be exempt from regulation if: it produces 25,000 gallons of water or 
less for domestic or livestock use; it was drilled prior to June 1, 2013, and does not produce more 
than 1,250 gallons of water a day; or if it is metered and does not produce more than 1.4 acre- 
feet of water per year (EAA Act).
Over the years, particularly following the adoption of the HCP, the management strategy 
has expanded in some significant ways, not the least of which includes the adoption of the 
Critical Period Management Plan (CPM), which provides the Authority with license to reduce 
the cap on total withdrawals during scarcity by a set percentage, interrupting access for even 
regular permit holders, conditional on the severity of the drought. The EAA may purchase 
permits that are made superfluous by this restriction, financing for which is dispatched by a 
number of institutions and funds, including the Texas Water Development Fund. Critical periods 
are classified into one of five stages, determined by ten-day average readings taken at index 
wells and the two major springs. The table below presents information about each stage, 
associated triggering minimums, and authorized reduction amounts. Readings are measured in 
feet above mean sea level at index wells, and cubic feet per second at springs.
T r ig g e r C rit ica l P e rio d
S a n  A n to n io  P o o l Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5
In d ex W ell J-17  (M SL) <660 <650 <640 <630 <625
San M arcos Sp rin gs F low  (CFS) <96 <80 N /A N /A N /A
<45 ( fo rte n  co n secu tive
Com al Sp rin gs F low  (CFS) <225 <200 <150 <100 d ays)/<40  (fo r th ree  
co n se cu tive  days)
W ith d raw al Reduction 20% 30% 35% 40% 44%
U v a ld e  P o o l
In d ex W ell J-27 N /A <850 <845 <842 <840
San M arcos Spri ngs F low  (CFS) N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A
Com al Sp rin gs F low  (CFS) N /A N /A N /A N /A N /A
W ith d raw al Reduction N /A 5% 20% 35% 44%
(Adaptedfrom figures provided by the Edwards Aquifer Authority)
Further, the CPM plan differentiates between discretionary (voluntary) and non-discretionary 
(obligated by a governmental program) withdrawals, requiring maximum feasible reductions of 
the former, and then reductions of the latter if necessary, by use. For example, non-discretionary 
withdrawals for recreation are reduced before those for industrial and crop irrigation. However, 
the authority has set a floor, currently at 320,000 acre-feet per year, below which withdrawals are 
not to drop. During a critical period, all municipal, industrial, and irrigation-use permit holders 
are required to submit monthly, rather than annual, reports.
A number of incentive-based, regulatory, and voluntary programs also exist to support 
groundwater management and wildlife preservation. The HCP, which has a term of 15 years, 
advises a number of conservation measures (organized into two broad categories and detailed 
below), to ensure the protection of species designated endangered or threatened by the USFWS 
to the extent mandated at the state-level in the EAA Act, and at the federal-level in the ESA.
These covered species include the Comal Springs Dryopid Beetle, the Comal Springs Riffle 
beetle, the Fountain Darter, Texas Wild Rice, and the Peck’s Cave Amphipod.
Habitat and Flow Protection Measures
T The Voluntary Irrigation Suspension Program Option (VISPO) allows eligible
permit-holders of irrigation rights to suspend all or a portion of their withdrawals for 
specified period of time in exchange for monetary compensation. If the water level at 
the J-17 index well in San Antonio declines to or below 635 feet above mean sea 
level, measured by the Authority on October 1 every year, then the program is 
deployed and participants cease withdrawals for the next calendar year beginning 
January 1.
II. The Regional Conservation Program (RCP) provides municipalities with financial 
remuneration to refrain from pumping half of conserved water for a period of 15 
years, with the goal of conserving 20,000 acre-feet of the total permitted or exempt 
volume. The RCP supports municipal water providers through low-flow toilet 
programs and leak detection.
III. The Stage 5 Critical Management Period, which was amended to the CPM plan 
through the HCP, is triggered when water levels fall to or below 625 feet above mean 
sea level for the San Antonio pool, measured at the J-17 index well, or 840 feet above 
mean sea level for the Uvalde pool, measured at the J-27 index well, and allows the 
Authority to reduce groundwater withdrawals by 44%.
IV. In addition to these, the Authority also collaborates with the SAWS in deployment of 
a flow augmentation program; water from the Edwards is stored at the SAWS Aquifer 
Storage and Recovery (ASR) facility, and used a baseload supply during extended 
droughts.
Supporting Measures
The Authority carries out a number of research and modeling efforts to support its conservation 
work including:
I. The EAHCP Applied Research program to collect data and further understand the 
ecological dynamics at Comal and San Marcos springs- which is then used in creating 
computer simulations to conduct project evaluations and generate information about 
the ecological consequences of plausible or hypothetical environmental scenarios.
II. Extensive Biological Monitoring of species, spring-flow, water quality and 
environmental conditions at Comal and San Marcos springs, which is published in 
annual reports.
III. The creation of off-site refugia facilities where covered species may be preserved 
during unanticipated or catastrophic events such as chemical spills.
The mandates set by the Act are enforceable by state law, and in the case that a covered facility 
violates them, whether related to withdrawals or contamination, the Authority may impose an 
administrative penalty, generally a fine between $100 and $1,000 for each infraction and each 
day that the infraction is not corrected. In some cases, the Authority may also file a civil suit in a 
state district court to recover a penalty between $100 and $1,000 for each violation, for every day 
the violation continues, and for attorney fees. It also reserves the right to seek injunctive relief
regarding water use, and has the power to enter land to enforce it, although it seeks permission in 
most circumstances (Friberg, 2016).
An Interview with Marc Friberg
Marc Friberg is the Executive Director o f Public Policy and External Affairs at the 
Edwards Aquifer Authority. Some o f the information presented above was collected during an 
interview with him in August, 2016. In a second interview (transcribed below), conducted on 
July 21, 2017, he addressed questions relevant to topics discussed in this paper, such as dynamic 
systemic effects o f trading on third-parties.
Kanishka: Thank you so much for your time Mr. Friberg. Before we start the interview, Fd like 
to provide a brief overview of what Fm hoping to address with my research if that’s alright? 
Marc: Of course, sure, go ahead.
K: Thank you. Fve read quiet a bit about the Edwards, from legal, political, hydrological, 
geological, and economic perspectives. I understand that regulation at the aquifer is unique in the 
sense that it exists to protect stream-flows, which provide aquatic habitat for some endangered 
species, whereas at many other groundwater market sites across the country, the objective is to 
maintain some minimum volume for human use, or to reallocate usage to more efficient 
applications. Also, it seems to me that the cap-and-trade scheme instituted by the Authority is 
working well, as the flow at Comal and San Marcos springs has been acceptable as has the 
volume of total withdrawals. My thesis explores the heterogeneous effects of trading water over 
space, and I am particularly concerned about things that the market might not reflect, such as 
changes in hydrostatic pressure, and how sometimes an effort to internalize the externalities
generated by distributing access to a shared, common resource like groundwater, may 
inadvertently generated new externalities (Here, the thought experiment that appears in the 
previous section o f this paper was providedfor illustration). So I realize that this theoretically 
might occur in some regions, but I was hoping to incorporate some of your insight on whether 
this happens at Edwards in my paper. I have a set of questions for you, but before I ask them, do 
you have any questions for me?
M: Sure, I don’t think so, I think I understand what you’re looking at here.
K: Excellent. So the first question I have is regarding the legal status of different kinds of water. 
From what I gather, surface flows and subsurface flows are managed by separate agencies in 
Texas. Considering that water systems are dynamic, and there may be interconnections between 
subterranean and surface waters, I am wondering what your assessment of this current 
institutional arrangement is? Do you think things could be better regulated under a conjunctive 
management structure?
M: I think things would be better if there was conjunctive management. But I think that we are 
so far down the road with this split process we have that it would be, administratively speaking, 
very cumbersome to get to that point. While I believe that everybody involved with groundwater 
management in this state recognizes the interconnections and the consequences one type of flow 
has on the other, it would still be very difficult to bridge the [institutional] gap. This is actually a 
very relevant issue as Texas begins to share water across the state, which is what a lot of our 
current politicians want to happen, a lot of them want to take water from East Texas and start 
helping out the drier regions in West Texas, especially since the Ogallala Aquifer is not going to 
yield forever, which is what mostly supplies the water needs of West Texas.
K: I see. And what do you think are the primary restraints to doing that? Is it just that it would be 
a very difficult legal process to change the way that groundwater and surface waters are 
governed?
M: It is that, and it’s also that the long-standing property rights laws that have developed in 
Texas, as well as the long-standing property rights culture that has developed with them would 
be really difficult to reverse. Landowner rights are so connected with groundwater rights issues, 
and that would be the biggest hurdle. A lot of our policymaking has historically respected 
landowner rights, and since we have proceeded with the rule-of-capture sort of approach with 
groundwater, it would just be very difficult to change that.
K: On the subject of administrative dominion, just to confirm, do you lose your jurisdiction over 
water as soon as it becomes surface level water, as it leaves the springs?
M: Yes, we do, from a usage standpoint, at that point it becomes property of the state. We do 
have some jurisdiction over water quality, but we cannot permit any water that has left the 
ground. Once groundwater has moved through the system and its discharged into a river through 
a wastewater plant or something, we do not have jurisdiction over that water either. So basically 
we lose jurisdiction after its first beneficial use.
K: Is there any coordination at all between surface water management agencies and the EAA?
M: There is some level of cooperation, but this mostly exchange of information. There is also 
some collaboration on maintaining water quality, but not really quantity.
K: That makes sense, thank you. So another thing I wanted to discuss is the initial distribution of 
permits. Some economists, especially when they analyze the rights of economic agents to pollute 
in a cap-and-trade scheme, prescribe permit auctioning as opposed to permit allocation. They 
argue that this allows you to generate revenue, which the government could reinvest in
productive ways. At Edwards, I understand they were allocated based on beneficial historic use, 
right?
M: Right.
K: What is your perspective on this issue?
M: I guess moving forward in time, as new people come into the area, the historical rights 
perspective has come under fire in Texas. These new people do not have any historical rights, so 
they cannot do with their property what they want to. There probably will not be another 
Groundwater Management District that uses historical rights the way that Edwards does. There 
was actually an attack on historical rights this last legislative session that would have done away 
with the whole system altogether for basically all areas in the state except for Edwards, but from 
an auctioning standpoint, it is difficult to determine an ownership for the government to auction 
off, so there has to be some mechanism for a starting point. Do the terms ‘Desired Future 
Conditions’ and ‘Modeled Available Groundwater’ mean anything to you?
K: No, could you tell me a little bit more about that?
M: Sure, so basically the way it works for everybody else in the state, is that the district asks 
‘What do we want our aquifer to be like in 30, 40, 50 years?’ And a prime example of this is the 
Ogallala. If they are managing the Ogallala, they have to consider how much drawdown can they 
allow over time. Many of the districts would estimate, say, 50 feet of drawdown over 50 years, 
and they send that determination, which is called the Desired Future Condition to the State Water 
Board, where they do a lot of groundwater modeling. They do this modeling to estimate how 
much water can be withdrawn every year in order to maintain that condition over that time 
frame, to generate a number, called the Modeled Available Groundwater, which the district then 
uses as a cap for permitting. So, in a sense, they are sort of auctioning it off, but nobody is
paying for it. In a sense, they are capping with scientific information, and limiting how much a 
district can have, based on the district’s application. That is the direction that Texas is moving, 
and that is how I anticipate that groundwater is going to be managed outside of the Edwards for 
the foreseeable future.
K: Just a quick digression on modeling-1 know that these subsurface structures are so 
complicated that sometimes simulation efforts can lead to somewhat of an oversimplification.
I’m assuming that the modeling accounts for the fact that conjunctive management isn’t 
happening, and that can limit system boundaries in an undesirable way?
M: Yes, they basically just look at the water balance, so what’s coming in, and what you’re 
taking out, and what that’s going to mean. And to be fair, the Desired Future Conditions that are 
determined by the districts are often based on spring-flow, and that’s the way that Edwards has 
set theirs up.
K: Oh I see, so the objective function is set with respect to spring-flow, and that is the important 
variable that determines how much water can be withdrawn?
M: Yes, so there are some that are based on spring-flow, the Edwards is, but not as many of 
them. Many of them are based on actual aquifer declines.
K: That make sense. Changing gears just a little bit- economists who advocate for cap-and-trade 
type schemes hypothesize that permit trading will occur in a way that is welfare maximizing. 
That is to say, usage, which is of course limited, will move to those users who value it the most. 
My review of the literature around this leads me to believe that much of this would lead to a shift 
from irrigative use, which might be water intensive and low efficiency, to municipal and 
industrial use. How much trading is actually happening at Edwards, and are there any trends 
there that can corroborate this theory?
M: At the Edwards it’s a pretty robust trading system. There are hundreds of trades that happen 
each year, and most of them are leased on temporary terms. When the San Antonio Water 
System got their permit and started planning for the future, they bought a lot of permits 
aggressively, and so we saw a lot of water moving from agriculture to municipal use. They have, 
since then, attempted to find alternative water supplies. So they have a desalination process from 
another aquifer that is high in salinity, and then they have a large pipeline project that is 
supposed to become operational by 2020 that will physically transport water from a distant area 
in Texas. Since they’ve tried to expand and diversify their supply, the irrigative to municipal 
trend has slowed. The Authority has been the main player in the market as we’ve been 
attempting to gather permits on a long-term lease basis for spring-flow protection measures as a 
part of the measures carried out under our Habitat Conservation Plan. We never intended this to 
be the case, but we are the biggest purchaser.
K: And how is the pricing determined? Do the individual actors have all the latitude to determine 
the price of a permit? Does the Authority arbitrate at all or are there any guidelines it provides? 
M: It is an open market, and the Authority has always tried to stay out of any type of influence 
on the market. It has stabilized over time. It started out at around $1,000 to $2,000 per acre-foot, 
and it has now plateaued at about $5,500, if you are buying. We do ask people who are trading 
how much they paid just so that we can keep a record, but there is no legal requirement for them 
to tell us.
K: In order to prevent some of the heterogeneous effects of spatial trading, I know that there is 
something called the Cibolo Creek Rule, that is supposed to prevent pumping from concentrating 
around the spring systems. But are there any other measures? And if not, do you think that there 
should be?
M: That’s really the only rule looking to address that kind of impact to the system. Interestingly, 
you asked about the market, and because of that rule, there is a subset of the market that is East 
of Cibolo Creek, and the water values there are double, so the price there is about $10,000 per 
acre-foot, because there is a restriction in supply and you cannot get water from the West. From 
our perspective, that is probably good enough, that has actually prevented all this pumping from 
concentrating around the springs. There are a number of advocates in this region that have 
wanted us to look at the hydrogeological impacts on a transfer-by-transfer basis, and their 
argument is that any movement of water that is going from West to East is going to have some 
sort of impact, because the groundwater moves in that direction. Personally, I cannot advocate 
for that. Because we permit on a year-to-year basis, and because of our Critical Period Reduction 
Plan, I believe the administrative difficulties that this would create would far exceed the potential 
benefits it would give to spring-flows.
K: What about return flows? With irrigative use, these flows could provide some of the water 
that third-party users rely on, and so non-consumptive use becomes important. How important 
are these flows at Edwards? And if trading causes a shift from non-consumptive to consumptive 
use, do you think that will be a problem?
M: There really isn’t any impact of return flows in the Edwards region. Where that becomes an 
issue is basically, what is called the basin estuary system, so downstream surface water inflows 
are where the return flows are going to be a big deal. For us, it doesn’t matter, because our 
recharge is not dependent on return flows, it’s just dependent on precipitation. Also, any region 
that relies on return flows is south of here, so no return flows move over our recharge zone, or a 
negligible amount do. But it is a big issue downstream, and it is a big issue as big cities start to
reuse their water instead of just discharging it, then downstream water rights from a surface 
water perspective is something that will need to be dealt with.
K: Got it. As I conducted my research, I found some theoretical evidence in support for trading 
programs in which some kind of superintending agency such as the EAA, or other agency of the 
government, would weight the price of the permits by a factor corresponding to its elevation and 
location. The idea here is that it would create a more dynamic pricing scheme which accounts for 
heterogeneous effects of trading over space and possible internalize third-party effects. Do you 
think this would be a practical solution for Edwards, or for most water management institutions? 
M: I think that might be cost-prohibitive. One thing to remember: the Edwards is brought up as a 
model in a lot of research, specifically its use of a market, but due to the karstic nature of the 
aquifer, when you trade your withdrawal right, there is no associated infrastructural change. In 
most of the rest of the state, groundwater is stored in sand aquifers, not karst aquifers, so you 
actually need piping infrastructure to move the water. You cannot just trade the right; you have 
to figure out the piping system in order to actually move that water from one point to another. In 
these cases, the point of withdrawal is not really changing, just the point of use. In our case, at 
the Edwards, the point of withdrawal does change, and it goes right with the point of use. So 
essentially, when you look at the impact of trade on our system as a whole, for all intents and 
purposes, the pumping is actually still actually taking place at the same spot. Our system works 
more fluidly, because you do not need a pipeline, as the aquifer itself is a pipeline.
K: That’s actually very helpful. So would it be accurate to say that at the Edwards, there is not as 
great of a hydrogeological impact of trade due to the high porosity of the aquifer?
M: Yes, that is what I would say. Granted, I’m more of a regulatory person, but there are legal 
arguments going back 20 or 30 years that argue that the Edwards isn’t really even a true aquifer,
it is just a giant underground river, and so it should be regulated like a river, but it is not. The 
final determination was that it is indeed an aquifer, in a definitional sense, and so it’s regulated 
as an aquifer. Regardless, the pressure heads at the Edwards work a little differently. As the 
water moves from the recharge area into the artesian zone, there is so much head pressure there 
that, as it moves West in the direction of the springs, it really doesn’t have as much of an impact, 
except for when you get really close to the spring systems. This is why we implemented a simple 
solution like the Cibolo Creek line, and even that is not a true hydrologic division. There is just 
some subterranean fault there that makes it the most appropriate place to draw a line based on the 
information generated by MODFLOW if we want to minimize impacts of trade to the aquifer 
system.
K: Do you keep a track of the location of the wells as they rearrange as a result of trade?
M: We do have a map of where all the wells are, but we do not keep track of permit transfers 
between wells. So if there are new wells, we have an image of that, but it would be very difficult 
to follow each permit that goes from one set of wells to another. And in most cases when there is 
a transfer, it’s only a portion of total water rights, so the original well stays and there are 
basically just new holes punched into the aquifer.
K: Are there are concerns related to changes in climate, or to natural gas and hydraulic 
fracturing, that the Authority has had to address?
M: We are not too concerned about fracking. Some of the districts south of here who do supply 
water for fracking may be. There has been some positive collaboration between the oil and gas 
industry and groundwater districts in the permitting process. Historically, water used for oil and 
gas is in Texas is exempt from permitting. That is not true in our case at Edwards, as we do not 
exempt that industry, but in any case we do not have any drilling or fracking that is happening
within our jurisdiction. It is also not possible to use our water at a location outside of our 
jurisdiction for fracking, as we have a prohibition on export. For the rest of the state, I’m not so 
sure that water use for the natural gas industry has gotten to the point where they are concerned 
about consumption. On the other hand, regarding climate change, we are starting to look into 
how we can best adapt, especially when it comes to aquatic species protection. The consequences 
of climate change are starting to become apparent. Historic droughts, for example, have always 
been these long periods of low precipitation and low yield, but what we think, and although we 
don’t have any substantive literature to back this up so this is just anecdotal, but the notion is that 
weather extremes will become more commonplace. So we are looking at three or four years of 
drought, followed by two or three years of fairly intense rain, and the weather will oscillate 
between times of plenty and times of nothing. We do believe that our drought reduction plan is a 
perfect mechanism to handle that.
K: So what you would do is toggle existing or newly established drought period restrictions on 
and off in accordance with where you are in the cycle in order to maintain a certain volume of 
spring-flow?
M: I think we might just keep the drought restrictions in place permanently, and we think that 
because of the intense period of rain, we would maintain a good volume. This is, again, all 
anecdotal though, we actually have yet to discuss the programmatic specifics. The drought 
restrictions we have in place have been working well to protect spring-flow.
K: Moving into the future, with commercial growth, and the associated population growth, do 
you think the system you have in place is sustainable?
M: I think so. I think the cap is here to stay. I do believe that with climate change and growing 
demand, there will be more Aquifer Storage and Recovery Projects, that aren’t necessary at
Edwards but at other aquifers in the state, which will allow you to take water from the Edwards 
and store it in times of plenty. This is basically like an off-channel reservoir, but it’s 
underground. I think users in the area will also have to start diversifying their supply, as the San 
Antonio Water System has done. Alternative sources are going to have to be important, and we 
will have to be constantly cognizant of whether we are achieving our conservation goals, but if 
we diversify and start limiting the total urban use, I think our scheme will be effective as far as 
maintaining the discharge at Comal and San Marcos. The farm irrigators out in the West may 
also have to change their crops as well, so that they are doing less water intensive agriculture, 
and the state may have to create incentives for this. It used to be corn only, and now we are 
seeing a shift in the direction of sesame seeds and maybe a little more cotton. You are going to 
see a combination of creative things happening if the consequences of climate change are severe, 
but I think in tandem with all of that, the permitting scheme will continue to operate.
K: Those are all the questions I have for you today. Thank you so much for your time, that was a 
very illuminating conversation. I’m grateful for your generosity.
M: No problem at all, I’m happy to help. Good luck on your thesis.
Alternative Solutions and Ancillary Instruments
The conversation with Marc Friberg, paired with an assessment of annual total discharge 
statistics and the Authority’s manifold ancillary programs, suggest that the groundwater 
management system deployed at Edwards is dynamic, and if appropriately manipulated and 
supported in the future, may prove to be adequate even as the consequences of climate change 
become more pronounced and frequent. While some of this reflects careful planning on the part 
of the state, and the fact that governance was engineered specifically to promote wildlife
conservation, the physical properties of the aquifer itself certainly facilitate successful 
management; as Skurray and Pannell (2012) intimate, “Under high-transmissivity conditions, 
limiting extractions to the sustainable yield addresses most impacts” (p. 885).
Nonetheless, a review of groundwater protection instruments, policies, and frameworks 
yields some valuable direction for market design in general. This section expands on the 
illustrative graph below to briefly review some mechanisms that may serve as alternatives to, or 
ancillaries for, cap-and-trade.
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As has been discussed in a number of sections throughout this paper, groundwater transfers, and 
the associated rearrangement of pumping, can create the potential for significant systemic shifts 
and unanticipated consequences due to hydrogeological transformation. There are spatial 
considerations, such as changes in points of origin and points of withdrawal, and as the effects of 
pumping are localized, there may be disparate impacts at each of these sites. There are also 
temporal considerations, such as delayed effects that manifest only after certain feedback loops
or emergent properties are realized. Further, as trading transfers water from one type of use to 
another, it may generate significant repercussions; one example is that irrigative use is seasonal 
and cyclical, and provides some time for off-season aquifer recovery, a feature which may be 
lost as use shifts to municipal or industrial applications (Skurray and Panned, 2012).
Given all of this, it is imperative that any agency tasked with developing a groundwater 
management program commence with a holistic evaluation of the human and natural elements of 
their region, and the necessary data collection and analysis. The definition of what is the optimal 
use of a given groundwater system cannot be reduced to social welfare maximization, and it 
cannot be assumed that a permit trading scheme will reallocate use most efficiently. To address 
the former, planners and policymakers must bring a multitude of stakeholders into the fold, 
including not just beneficial users such as farmers and municipal water institutions, but also 
environmentalists, recreationists, hydrologists and geologists, ecologists, biologists, and 
hydrogeological modelers. The entitlements of the environment, natural systems, and of other 
species to continue to exist sustainably must be accounted for as well.
Region-specific modeling should help demystify structural and hydrological 
idiosyncrasies, and consultations with varying concerns may reveal aspects of the CHANS that 
had not initially been considered.
A simple monetization of the value generated by aquifer yield is not likely to lead to a 
sufficiently thorough understanding of the groundwater complex or an accurate valuation of its 
natural resource yield; it may be necessary to have economists perform non-market valuations of 
the environmental benefits provided. Indeed, “a sound groundwater transfer scheme should 
address unvalued (non-market) impacts, as well as financial externalities” (Skurray and Panned, 
2012, p. 884).
Economic ripples generated by human actions in the absence of transparent and full 
information generates confounding externalities, and considering a comprehensive panel of 
stakeholders can support a fair conceptualization of optimality and an accurate determination of 
sustainable yield, this completeness of information must also reflect in permit prices and 
property rights. Skurray and Panned (2012) recognize that collecting and disseminating 
meticulous information regarding biophysical processes and prospective third-party impacts may 
be a cost-prohibitive and time-intensive process. The researchers suggest instead that the 
composite groundwater system be separated into parts with distinct hydrological boundaries, and 
an estimation of sustainable yield for each subsystem be derived through the analysis of net 
recharge information from the immediately preceding year, or from the rolling average of a 
number of years. Further, they advise that while...
... a certain volume of water left in a river may provide ‘environmental flows’, 
while the same approach to groundwater systems may leave water-tables too low 
to meet the needs of surface GDEs [groundwater-dependent ecosystems] and/or to 
provide sufficient water levels in caves or baseflow to streams. This is the case for 
phreatophytic vegetation, for wetland flora and fauna, as well as for ecosystems 
dependent upon baseflow to streams (p. 884).
Essentially, what is being recommended here is what can be understood as somewhat of a zoning 
effect, through which subterranean details of the natural system can be understood and better 
integrated with their corresponding economic, or human aspects. A number of policy-based 
instruments that can work in tandem with permit trading exist to achieve this, some of which
have been reviewed below. Two important points worth reemphasizing here are that auctioning 
may serve as a better format of permit dispersal than grandfathering, as it allows the government 
to generate supplemental revenue, and it may be more equitable to distribute entitlements in 
accordance with the present and prospective future needs of a variety of stakeholders, as opposed 
to historic rights, which are somewhat of a vestige of the prevailing paradigms of water 
development in the U.S., which have proven to be rather shortsighted.
Limits on Transfers
One of the more problematic scenarios groundwater market architects should attempt to preclude 
is the spatial concentration of withdrawals. From a groundwater hydrology perspective, such 
activity can create a cone of depression, leading to aforementioned unanticipated system phase 
shifts through feedback loops and emergent behavior. From a socio-economic point of view, they 
can lead to market disruptions and negative externalities; Skurray and Pannell (2012) ask readers 
to “consider a large horticultural operation that buys groundwater allocations from surrounding 
smaller users. By not selling their allowance, a small neighbor user incurs disproportionate but 
compensable increases in pumping costs, but may also suffer the loss of a particular local way of 
life as other affected community members move out of the area” (p. 885).
To avoid this, it is suggested that regional boundaries for trading be demarcated, either 
with geographical limitations that restrict the movement of water trading within a certain area, or 
with volumetric limitations that decrease the total amount of water moved from one zone to 
another. Skurray and Pannell (2012) discuss another scenario:
.. where adjacent management areas are hydraulically connected.. .there is a 
potential for cross-border concentration. High-value uses located closely together, 
but on either side of a management boundary, could cause accumulation of 
pumping rights such that, at the extreme, the entire transferable volume of both 
management areas becomes concentrated at the two closely adjacent locations. To 
guard against the potential impacts of such a situation using trading limits alone 
would require them to be set lower than otherwise necessary, thus presenting 
unnecessary restrictions on other potential transfers. Using trading limits in 
combination with other tools such as concentration limits or exchange rates, 
would be preferable in such cases (p. 886).
Exchange Rates
Having the monetary value of permits reflect different gradations of the hydrogeological 
effects of trading them through differential exchange rates indexed against categorically or 
regionally specific weight functions is perhaps one of the most intuitive and sophisticated 
mechanisms through which to internalize the confounding externalities of groundwater 
entitlement transfer. Broadly speaking, it provides a mechanism through which superintending 
agencies can signal the potential for third-party effects to economic agents, and therefore deter or 
promote certain kinds of market activity. Of course, the process of aggregating, analyzing, and 
supplying the relevant information is likely to be unfeasible on a transfer-by-transfer basis. 
Instead, if regional or categorical boundaries have already been established, exchange rates can 
be calibrated between them (Skurray and Panned, 2012).
To illustrate, consider again the thought experiment from a previous section in this paper 
involving users U and D who shifted the point of groundwater withdrawal from a region of low 
elevation to high elevation. If the potential for the reduction of hydrostatic pressure and return 
flows could be generally understood through hydrological modeling in that specific region, an 
exchange rate could be determined for all transfers that take place from one range of elevations 
to another range of elevations. Perhaps in that particular case, the two users may have realized 
that such a trade was suboptimal and the confounding externalities generated could have 
stymied.
Beyond elevation, parameters that could be used in the calculation of exchange rates are: 
the environmental stressors associated with trade; the distance or position of a pumper relative to 
key hydrogeological locations, such as spring systems, recharge areas, and other high risk zones; 
upstream and downstream statuses (Skurray and Panned, 2012); volume of return flows 
generated; type of groundwater application; and the potential for other neighborhood effects.
Locational Rights
Hung et al. (2014) make the case that certain hydrological certainties can serve as the 
foundation for location-specific regulation of water trading. Their research suggests_that a system 
of locational rights, through which caps on maximum resource exploitation are mandated based 
on the relative upstream or downstream status of points of withdrawal, can mitigate third-party 
effects related to quantity declines due to the exhaustion of upstream sources and return flows. 
The basic idea here is that since water flows uni directionally downstream, the management 
scheme accounts for status quo flows, diversion trading, consumption trading, locational water 
right access, environmental flows, and return flows, calculating a limit on use at each point along
the river system in order to achieve volumetric objectives. The paper, titled “Water Trading: 
Locational Water Rights, Economic Efficiency, and Third-Party Effect” elucidates Hung et al.’s 
(2014) optimization modeling methodology, which is outside of the scope of this paper, but is 
recommended reading for researchers and students interested in the mathematical expression of 
dynamic flow properties. While their work assumes perfect information, the researchers admit 
this to be an unrealistic expectation, and suggest that two schemes be deployed, one for the 
actual locational water right flows, and when the wrinkles in this market are ironed out, another 
for return flows; the hypothesis here is that as trades yield more information, the economics of 
the two policy systems will synchronize. Furthermore, organizing a market to follow the physical 
direction of flow can support a market architecture that also achieves a natural cadence over 
time, so that if entitlements must be rescinded in extraordinary circumstances such as drought, 
the downstream ramifications can be more accurately predicted.
Groundwater is of course distinct from surface reservoirs in that many system dynamics 
are obfuscated by confounding subterranean physical structures, and intra-aquifer flow may not 
be unidirectional. Nonetheless, if management zones are constructed along the lines of general 
topographical and hydrogeological features, a causal chain of hydrologic reactions can be 
realized within each, so that entitlements and their corresponding restrictions during times of 
scarcity can be determined to reduce the probability of unintended effects, confounding 
externalities, and third-party impacts. Locational rights may be a policy instrument that buttress a 
more complicated and extensive management scheme, such as exchange rates and limits.
Concluding Remarks
It is evident that groundwater conservation is as intricate a problem as it is exigent. Given the 
dynamic properties of subterranean flows, the nebulous geophysics of their encasing structures, 
and the indefiniteness of their system boundaries, it is evident that replicable market-based 
solutions that have only economic theoretical foundations are insufficient for aquifer 
management, as the idiosyncratic hydrogeological features of these systems are 
incommensurable. For these reasons, there is also a greater potential for unexpected and 
pernicious consequences of myopic policy efforts applied to aquifer stewardship relative to 
surface waters. Indeed, policy analysis that neglects to account for these third-party effects may 
lead to the construction of an incomplete market and at its worst, precipitate irreversible system 
phase shifts.
This is not to say that underground water resources are ungovernable; it is necessary, 
however, to understand these systems holistically, considering both their natural and human 
elements, in order to design truly efficacious governance plans. Each superintending agency 
must holistically evaluate the manifold aspects of the coupled human and natural groundwater 
system they are attempting to manage, prognosticate the consequences of climate change and 
other forms of disruptive natural and anthropogenic phenomena, and anticipate the probability of 
emergent behavior, feedback loops, and sources of vulnerabilities.
The primary objective of this paper is to appraise the efficacy of property rights-based 
groundwater conservation, illuminate factors that this approach may miss, apply systems 
thinking concepts to better appreciate the complexity of subterranean water resources, and 
propose alternative and supporting management strategies with apropos conceptual 
corroboration. In reality, different combinations of the ancillary mechanisms reviewed (as well
as others not reviewed) will have to be deployed at different aquifer systems, depending on site- 
specific properties.
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